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Narratives of crisis in the periphery of São Paulo: Place and political articulation 
during the rightward turn
Abstract
Between 2014 and 2018, a period marked by major political and economic upheaval, Brazilian 
politics shifted sharply to the right. Presenting qualitative research conducted over 2016-17, 
this article examines this process from the perspectives of residents of a peripheral São Paulo 
neighbourhood. Analysis is presented of three broad groups of respondents, each of which 
mobilised a distinct narrative framework for interpreting the crisis. Based on this, I argue that 
the rightward turn in urban peripheries does not embody a significant ideological shift, but 
rather long-term transformations of place and the largely contingent ways these articulate with 
electoral politics. 
Key words: Brazil; Peripheries; Place; Political attitudes; Crisis; Subjectivity; Workers’ Party.
Introduction
On October 28th, 2018, after a bitter and highly polarized election campaign, far-right 
congressman Jair Bolsonaro of the Partido Social Liberal (Social Liberal Party, PSL) defeated 
his opponent, Fernando Haddad of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), 
to become President of Brazil. Bolsonaro’s run-off victory, winning 55% of valid votes, 
completed a dramatic rightward turn in Brazilian electoral politics since 2014, when former 
president Dilma Rousseff had achieved re-election to begin a fourth successive term of PT-led 
government. 
The period between the two elections was widely regarded as one of unrelenting economic and 
political crisis. In 2016, against the backdrop of a severe recession, corruption investigations 
and mass street protests, Rousseff was controversially impeached on charges of manipulating 
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public accounts. She was replaced by her Vice President Michel Temer of the conservative 
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, 
PMDB), whose already low approval ratings plummeted further as the economy failed to 
recover and allegations of corruption against him emerged. In April 2018, former president 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was convicted on dubious corruption charges, preventing him from 
running as the PT’s candidate in the upcoming election, despite him being the clear favourite. 
This cleared the way for Bolsonaro, then a distant second in the opinion polls, who surged into 
a formidable lead during a short and unusual election campaign in which he survived an 
assassination attempt, eventually defeating Lula’s replacement, Haddad.
Given the volatility of this period, the contingency of events and a general weakness of party 
identification in Brazil, it is difficult to gauge how far the electoral shift from the PT to 
Bolsonaro between 2014 and 2018 reflects a deep and durable swing to the right in public 
opinion and voting alignments. The challenge is even greater when we look at the diverse social 
groups who eventually came to vote for Bolsonaro. Election eve polling indicated that while 
he led heavily among higher-income voters, he had also attracted significant numbers of those 
on lower incomes.1 In regional terms the divide was clearer, with the wealthy Southeast region 
voting overwhelmingly for Bolsonaro, while the poorer Northeast heavily backed the PT. 
However, within this broad landscape, the low-income peripheries of wealthier metropolises 
like São Paulo stand out as distinctive.2 Unlike middle-class voters in these same regions, who 
1 G1, ‘Datafolha de 27 de outubro para presidente por sexo, idade, escolaridade, renda, região 
e religião’, 27 October 2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/eleicao-em-
numeros/noticia/2018/10/27/datafolha-de-27-de-outubro-para-presidente-por-sexo-idade-
escolaridade-renda-regiao-e-religiao.ghtml [accessed 9/3/19]
2 The peripheries of Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre show roughly similar 
voting trends between 2002 and 2018. See: Alberto Carlos Almeida, O voto do brasileiro (Rio 
de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2018); Estadão, ‘Como votou sua vizinhança? Explore o mapa 
mais detalhado das eleições’, https://www.estadao.com.br/infograficos/politica,como-votou-
sua-vizinhanca-explore-o-mapa-mais-detalhado-das-eleicoes,935858 [accessed 9/3/19]
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had long voted against the PT, and low-income voters in the Northeast, who mostly still voted 
for the Party in 2018, the election confirmed the peripheries as key swing areas in Brazil. They 
had been an important part of the winning electoral coalitions of Presidents Lula (2003-2010) 
and Dilma (2011-2016), but had now swung heavily behind Bolsonaro. 
Despite their importance and distinctiveness within Brazil’s electoral landscape, little research 
has examined changing political attitudes in the peripheries of wealthier Brazilian cities. This 
article contributes to this task. Based on qualitative research conducted in a neighbourhood in 
the periphery of São Paulo over the course of 2016 and 2017, it explores how respondents 
experienced the crisis and interpreted it politically. Contrary to claims that the rightward 
electoral turn in peripheries reflects an ideological shift towards more individualistic and/or 
socially conservative attitudes,3 the empirical data paints a far more nuanced picture.
The argument focuses on two aspects in particular. Firstly, there was relative consensus among 
respondents in their emphasis on issues such as squeezed incomes, poor public services and 
urban insecurity, and complaints about the inability and unwillingness of the political class to 
address them. Secondly, however, there was significant diversity in the way these concerns 
translated into electoral preferences. To dig into these differences, I identify three groups of 
respondents – labelled ‘angry workers’, ‘disgruntled citizens’ and ‘nostalgic strugglers’ – each 
of which mobilised a distinct narrative framework for interpreting the crisis. I argue that 
respondents’ adhesion to one or other of these frameworks can be traced to individuals’ life 
experiences and networks of sociability, both heavily linked to place, and that these 
frameworks also articulate with mainstream political debates in uneven and unpredictable 
ways. As such, I propose that the rightward turn in peripheries should be understood as 
3 For example, Fundação Perseu Abramo, Percepções e valores políticos nas periferias de 
São Paulo (São Paulo: Pesquisas FPA, 2017)
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resulting from a particular constellation of social and institutional conditions and their 
contingent interaction with developments in the sphere of official politics. 
The remainder of the article is structured into four sections. The next section provides an 
overview of recent debates on social structure and political attitudes in Brazil. The following 
section discusses the ways in which long-term transformations have altered social and 
institutional arrangements in peripheries, placing this in the context of arguments about the 
importance of place and of political articulation for electoral outcomes. In the subsequent 
section I present my empirical analysis. First I offer a brief explanation of the research methods, 
followed by an overview of the research site, its social characteristics and recent electoral 
trends. I then present interview material, analysing the three sub-groups already identified. This 
is followed by a discussion section that draws out the key implications for how we understand 
the formation of political attitudes in urban peripheries today, and a conclusion outlining the 
article’s contribution to debates about what has driven Brazil’s rightward turn.
Social structure and political subjectivity in Brazil
In recent years, there have been wide-ranging debates about social transformations in Brazil 
and their implications for political attitudes and alignments.4 These tended have to focus on the 
impacts that economic growth and the PT’s redistributive policies during the 2000s had on 
Brazil’s social structure. Income-based measures suggested that large numbers of poor 
Brazilians had risen into the ‘classe c’ (located between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the 
income ladder), interpreted by some as the emergence of a ‘new middle class’ (NMC) in 
4 Maria H. T. Almeida and Fernando H. Guarnieri, ‘Towards a (poor) middle-class democracy? 
Upward mobility and politics under Lula and Dilma’, in Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. 
Power (eds.) Democratic Brazil Divided (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), pp. 
175-90; Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos, ‘Electoral realignment and economic change among 
Brazil’s “new middle class”’, Latin American Politics and Society, 57: 3 (2015), pp. 147-54.
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Brazil.5 Liberal commentators adopting such arguments in Brazil and other “emerging” 
economies have claimed they the NMC represents a quasi-revolutionary force that uses its 
growing influence to demand an end to corruption, the deepening of democracy and/or 
liberalising economic reforms.6 A similar argument was made in a study of disillusioned 
former PT voters in the peripheries of São Paulo, in which it was argued that a new ideology 
of “popular liberalism” had taken hold, characterised by a declining working-class solidarity 
and increasingly meritocratic and pro-market values.7
However, the NMC thesis has been heavily criticised on a number of fronts. Income-based 
measures neglect other key aspects of class, such as educational qualifications and occupation. 
Once these are included, changes to the social structure during this period appear far less 
significant.8 Rather than a NMC, ‘new working class’ seemed to more effectively capture the 
shift, in which workers had seen their incomes and consumption rise without significant 
changes to their life trajectories. Meanwhile, the labour conditions experienced by this new 
working class had become increasingly precarious, continuing a trend since the 1990s.9 
Critiques along such lines could produce quite different patterns of political behaviour within 
the classe c. Souza, for example, argued that the precariously employed new working class 
5 Marcelo Neri, A nova classe média: o lado brilhante da base da pirâmide (Rio de Janeiro: 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2011).
6 Frances Fukuyama, ‘The middle-class revolution’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2013, 
available at 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323873904578571472700348086 
[accessed 23/02/18]; The Economist, ‘The new middle classes rise up: Marx’s revolutionary 
bourgeoisie finds its voice again’, 3 September 2011, available at 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2011/09/03/the-new-middle-classes-rise-up [accessed 
04/07/18]
7 Fundação Perseu Abramo, Percepções e valores
8 Márcio Pochman, Nova classe média? O trabalho social na base da pirâmide social 
brasileira (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2012); Jessé Souza, Os batalhadores brasileiras: nova classe 
média ou nova classe trabalhadora? (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2012).
9 Ruy Braga, ‘Para onde vai o precariado brasileiro? Sindicalismo e hegemonia no Brasil 
contemporâneo’, Perseu, 10 (2013), pp. 35-54
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retained a value system that prized solidarity, predicting that this would lead them to continue 
backing the PT and its redistributive programme.10 For Braga, by contrast, the ‘precariat’ was 
becoming increasingly frustrated with the social settlement of the Lula era, leading to a rise in 
industrial unrest even during the boom years.
Others have addressed similar questions from the perspective of political parties and shifting 
electoral alignments. For example, Singer’s influential thesis proposed that an important shift 
occurred in the PT’s voter base between Lula’s first victory in 2002 and his re-election in 2006, 
moving away from the traditional middle classes based in the Southeast and South of the 
country, and towards a ‘sub-proletariat’ disproportionately living in the Northeast region.11 For 
Singer, this reflected a shift in the PT’s electoral strategy towards a ‘conservative pact’ that 
combined redistributive social and economic policies for the poor with the preservation of 
traditional elite economic and institutional power. However, this pact would fall apart under 
Dilma Rousseff’s presidency as the economic situation deteriorated from 2014 onwards and 
both elites and, eventually, many lower-income voters abandoned the PT.12
In accounting for these electoral realignments it is also important to consider the growth of 
ideological forces ranged against PT. According to Almeida, recent years have seen a 
‘conservative wave’ in Brazil, consisting of diverse elements that ultimately converged in 
Bolsonaro’s winning candidacy.13 He identifies four distinct but interrelated tendencies: (1) an 
economic one, aimed at reducing state social spending and ideologically framed around values 
10 Souza, Os batalhadores brasileiros, pp. 199-257
11 André Singer, Os sentidos do lulismo: reforma gradual e pacto conservador (São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras, 2012); See also Oswaldo E. do Amaral and Timothy J. Power, ‘The PT 
at 35: Revisiting scholarly interpretations of the Brazilian Workers’ Party, Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 48 (2015), pp. 147-71
12 André Singer, O Lulismo em crise: uma quebra cabeça do período Dilma (2011-2016) (São 
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018)
13 Ronaldo de Almeida, ‘Bolsonaro presidente: Conservadorismo, evangelismo e a crise 
brasileira’, Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 38: 1, pp. 185-213
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of individual effort and private initiative; (2) a moral one, seeking the defense of the traditional 
family and opposed to the liberalisation of cultural norms and the extension of women’s and 
LGBT rights; (3) a security one, demanding more repressive measures in response to 
widespread concerns about crime and insecurity; (4) and a social one, expressed in a growing 
intolerance of political differences in interpersonal relationships. The clearest expression of the 
latter is the rise in ‘antipetismo’, referring to individual animosity towards the PT that overrides 
positive support for another party or programme.14 Although these different strands have 
distinct dynamics and are visible to greater or lesser degrees within different parts of the 
population, there are elements that cut across them. These include a unifying “anti-corruption” 
discourse, encompassing diverse grievances and a general sense that things in the country are 
getting worse. Almeida also notes the significant overlap between these themes and issues 
prioritized by Brazil’s growing Evangelical movement, such as the so-called ‘gospel of 
prosperity’, which prizes individual material enrichment through entrepreneurial activity, and 
opposition to cultural liberalism. This seeming affinity appears to be reflected in the fact that 
Evangelicals favoured Bolsonaro over Haddad by a rate of more than two-to-one.15
Urban peripheries, place and political articulation
While offering important insights, such analyses at the national level do not fully capture the 
specificities of social and political dynamics in urban peripheries. Instead, it is necessary to 
understand these as places that possess particular histories and contemporary conditions which 
mean that they relate to broader trends in particular ways. Peripheries were primarily settled 
through processes of ‘peripheral urbanisation’, whereby residents built their own homes and 
14 An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that many antipetistas identify as “independent” 
voters and express a preference for broadly centre-left policies, suggesting that has more to do 
with negative perceptions of the PT than ideological objections to their policy agenda. See 
André Borges and Robert Vidigal, ‘Do lulismo ao antipetismo? Polarização, partidarismo e 
voto nas eleições presidenciais brasileiras’, Opinião Pública, 24: 1 (2018), pp. 53-84
15 Almeida, ‘Bolsonaro presidente’, p. 206
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neighbourhoods.16 The expansion of these areas between the 1950s and 1980s rested on a 
particular social formation, described by Feltran as the “project” of the laborer’s family.17 
These families, characterised by a sharply gendered division of labour and headed by low-paid 
but stably employed manual workers, were able to gradually save up to buy plots of land, build 
homes and raise children who would eventually be better off than their parents. 
As explained by Caldeira, the politics of peripheral urbanisation were “transveral” to the 
state.18 In order to gain access to essential public infrastructure and services, residents had to 
either mobilise in social movements or work through clientelistic networks, creating incentives 
for collective organisation and meaning that citizenship was at stake in the very process of 
urbanisation. During the 1980s, these processes flowered as neighbourhood movements, trade 
unions and radical grassroots Catholic organisations rooted in the peripheries, along with 
emergent left-wing political parties, played a decisive role in driving forward Brazil’s long 
process of redemocratisation.
However, as recounted by Feltran, since the 1990s conditions in peripheries have been 
dramatically transformed by a range of “dislocations”.19 First, as discussed previously, there 
has been a dislocation in the world of work, with the decline of Fordist production and 
concomitant rise in unemployment and precarity. This has destabilised the “project” of 
intergenerational social mobility in peripheries, even if after 2003 the PT’s social programs 
significantly reduced poverty and created new opportunities for individual social mobility. 
Second, popular Catholic religiosity has been challenged by the dramatic growth of Pentecostal 
16 Teresa P. R. Caldeira, ‘Peripheral urbanization: autoconstruction, transversal logics, and 
politics in cities of the global south’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 35: 1 
(2017), pp. 3-20
17 Gabriel S. Feltran, Fronteiras de Tensão: Política e Violência nas Periferias de São Paulo 
(São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2011)
18 Caldeira, ‘Peripheral urbanization’
19 Feltran, Fronteiras de Tensão 
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denominations, characterised by different institutional arrangements and forms of worship that 
appear less compatible with progressive agendas. While such churches have expanded hugely 
in peripheries, it is nonetheless important to note that their worshippers appear to be highly 
fluid in their religious practices and to circulate between different denominations, challenging 
the common perception of Evangelicals as religiously dogmatic.20
A third dislocation is that social movements have been weakened in terms of their ability to 
represent the peripheral population, even if they remain active and gained significant influence 
under PT governments. This is partly due to processes of institutionalisation and partly due to 
shifting needs in peripheries, away from basic urban infrastructure and services and towards 
more complex challenges like improving education and security. The fourth significant change 
in peripheries, meanwhile, is the dramatic growth of illegal markets and violence.21 In the case 
of São Paulo, following a huge increase in violence during the 1990s, the Primeiro Comando 
da Capital (First Command of the Capital, PCC) criminal faction consolidated its power in the 
peripheries during the 2000s, leading to a substantial fall in homicides. However, although the 
PCC regulates the world of organized crime with relative efficiency, the persistence of low-
level criminality and of conflict between criminals and police continue to feed widespread 
feelings of insecurity among residents of São Paulo’s peripheries.
While these socio-spatial transformations in peripheries have been well documented, few 
studies have directly examined their implications for residents’ political attitudes. One 
exception is the aforementioned study by the Fundação Perseu Abramo, which argued that a 
rise in consumerism and individualism during the PT years led many peripheral voters to adopt 
increasingly pro-market attitudes and thus to eventually abandon the PT’s redistributionist 
20 See Ronaldo de Almeida, ‘Religião na metrópole paulista’, Revista Brasileira de Ciências 
Sociais, 19: 56, pp. 15-27
21 Feltran, Fronteiras de Tensão
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agenda. A couple of recent ethnographic studies, however, suggests that the reality is more 
complex. Rocha, for example, found that that support for the PT among many residents in the 
neighbourhood of Brasilândia in São Paulo’s North Zone remained strong. However, it largely 
rested on “symbolic” dimensions, of past associations and a personal identification with the 
figure of Lula, rather than an active presence of the Party in the area or people attributing 
material improvements in their lives to PT policies.22 Rocha questions the sustainability of this 
support, especially given that older residents are far more likely than young people to retain 
such symbolic identifications. Based on research in the periphery of Porto Alegre, meanwhile, 
Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco argue that many young men who participated in Brazil’s 
consumer economy during the boom years became increasingly frustrated as opportunities 
were foreclosed by the economic crisis.23 At the same time, feeling their status threatened by 
the growing empowerment of young women and directly experiencing the effects of crime and 
insecurity in their everyday lives, many embraced the candidacy of Bolsonaro as representing 
the restoration of a threatened (masculine) order. 
The small number of studies on this issue to date offer means there is only limited evidence of 
how broad trends interacted with local and contingent factors to reshape political attitudes in 
peripheries during Brazil’s rightward turn. However, analyses of electoral ruptures elsewhere 
can offer further tools for analysis. McQuarrie, for example, argues that in order to understand 
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US election we must look to transformations that produced 
a localised ‘revolt of the Rust Belt’.24 McQuarrie argues that long-term deindustrialisation not 
22 Camila Rocha, ‘Petismo e lulismo na periferia de São Paulo: uma abordagem qualitativa’, 
Opinião Pública 24: 1 (2018), pp. 29-52
23 Rosana Pinheiro-Machado and Lucia M. Scalco, ‘Da esperança ao ódio: A juventude 
periférica bolsonarista’, in Esther S. Gallego (ed.) O Ódio como Política: A Reinvenção das 
Direitas no Brasil (São Paulo: Boitempo, E-book edition, 2018).
24 Michael McQuarrie, ‘The revolt of the Rust Belt: place and politics in the age of anger’, The 
British Journal of Sociology 68: S1 (2017), S120-152
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only produced rising unemployment and poverty, but also served to weaken embedded 
relationships between rustbelt voters and the Democratic Party, which had been mediated by 
declining trade unions. Trump was able to take advantage of the erosion of Democratic support 
by politicising economic decline through a campaign that combined attacks on migrants with 
gestures towards economic nationalism. Thus, while objective and subjective transformations 
of place had created new political opportunities, it was only the articulation of this by a political 
actor that ultimately produced an electoral impact.
This is reminiscent of long-standing analyses, broadly within the Gramscian tradition, about 
how changing social conditions can be exploited by political actors to produce ideological 
ruptures, particularly at moments of crisis. Hall famously offered such an account of the rise 
of Thatcherism in Britain, explaining how economic crisis was increasingly experienced by 
many “through the themes and representations […] of a virulent, emergent "petty-bourgeois" 
ideology”.25 Rather than a natural consequence of the crisis, Hall argued this process was the 
product of active political and ideological work to “disarticulate old formations, and to rework 
their elements into new configurations”.26 Echoing such a view, de Leon et al. argue that:
ethnoreligious, economic, and gender differences, among others, have no natural political 
valence of their own and thus do not, on their own steam, predispose mass electorates to 
do anything. Nor do certain kinds of crisis (such as economic) have an elective affinity 
for certain parties (for example, socialist, fascist, or religious). Whether variation in 
religious affiliation becomes politically salient in times of war or recession, for instance, 
depends in part on whether parties articulate it as a matter of contention.27
25 Stuart Hall, ‘The great moving right show’, Marxism Today, January (1979), p. 15.
26 Ibid.
27 Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal, Building Blocs: How Parties Organize 
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). 
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That is to say that changing social and material conditions experienced in particular places can 
become politicised in different ways depending on how they are framed and understood. The 
analysis that follows identifies both the constraining effects of current social conditions in 
peripheries, which tend to produce significant consensus among residents on a range of issues, 
but also major variations in how these are politicised and thus how they translate into electoral 
outcomes. 
Narratives of crisis and political attitudes in Fazenda da Juta
Research methods
My fieldwork was carried out in Fazenda da Juta, a neighbourhood of around 38,000 residents 
in the district of Sapopemba (IBGE, 2010) in São Paulo’s East Zone (See Figure 1). In-depth, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with 39 residents, alongside further interviews with 
key informants from local schools, churches, community organisations, health centres and the 
police. All respondents were identified via snowballing and although I did not use formal 
sampling, I sought balance and representativeness in terms of key demographic variables like 
age, gender, religion, race, income and housing type. Interviews typically lasted between 45 
and 90 minutes and covered a range of themes, including individual biographies, daily routines, 
attitudes towards the neighbourhood and broader discussions on diverse social and political 
issues. The research also involved participant observation via more informal forms of 
engagement with residents and regular participation in activities run by local community 
organisations.
Figure 1. Location of Fazenda da Juta
<FIGURE 1>
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The research was conducted between March 2016 and November 2017, a period that saw a 
series of major political events which were widely discussed in the national media and in 
everyday conversations. These diverse, often confusing developments provided an extremely 
dynamic backdrop to the fieldwork.28 However, the ways in which respondents discussed these 
issues and events provided insights into how they assimilated such new information into more 
stable worldviews. In what follows, I first provide some general information about the research 
site and present quantitative data of its social characteristics and recent electoral trends. I then 
present interview material, through the discussion of three broad groups of respondents 
identified. Although focused on a small number of individual cases, these provide insights into 
recurring themes and discourses in the research and are reflective of broader findings.
The neighbourhood of Fazenda da Juta: An overview
History, demography and social characteristics
Fazenda da Juta (henceforth “Juta”) was settled via a complex and often conflictual process of 
urbanisation during the 1980s and 1990s, which involved numerous land occupations and 
mutirão projects backed by social movements.29 While the construction of the neighbourhood 
occurred under precarious social conditions, today Juta is relatively well-served by public 
infrastructure, and also benefits from a strong network of local community organisations with 
origins in the housing movements. However, it also faces many of the challenges common 
across São Paulo’s peripheries: high levels of vulnerability, poor quality schools, patchy 
healthcare provision, and insecurity generated by both criminal actors and police.
28 Dates are provided for each interview cited.
29 Mutirões are co-operative housing projects in which residents, organised through social 
movements, pressure authorities for the provision of land, materials and technical support, and 
then carry out the actual building work themselves. Juta’s mutirão projects in the 1990s became 
a famous example of this form of popular housing production. See Matthew A. Richmond and 
Moisés Kopper, ‘Housing movements and the politics of worthiness at the margins’, Latin 
American Perspectives (forthcoming)
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Although last conducted only in 2010, the National Census offers important insights into the 
general profile of Juta’s population and the ways it changed during the Lula era. Table 1 shows 
the percentage of households that fell into different minimum wage bands (the income measure 
used in the census) in both 2000 and 2010. It reveals that the proportion with incomes of less 
than two minimum wages rose in both Juta and São Paulo between 2000 and 2010, while the 
proportion of those in all higher brackets fell. This would seem to indicate that the population 
became poorer. However, given the large increase in the minimum wage during this period, 
the opposite is in fact true.30 Using inflation adjusted values, we can see that while more than 
half of Juta’s residents earned more than R$510 per month (the minimum wage) in 2010, this 
would have been closer to a third in 2000. While more than 20% earned over R$1020 (two 
minimum wages) in 2010, this would have been well under 10% in 2000. 
Table 1. Real monthly household income per capita (for all household members aged 10+) in 
minimum wages for Fazenda da Juta and the municipality of São Paulo, 2000 and 2010 (% of 
households)31
<TABLE 1>
Source: Elaborated by author from IBGE Censo 2000 and IBGE Censo 2010 (Amostra)
As shown in Table 2, rising incomes and the falling cost of many consumer goods allowed for 
a major expansion in consumption during this period. For example, the proportion of 
households with a washing machine or laptop increased dramatically, although the increase for 
more expensive goods like cars was far smaller.
Table 2. Possession of consumer goods in Fazenda da Juta, 2000 and 2010 (% of households)
30 The minimum wage in 2000 was R$151 per month, but by 2010 had risen to R$510. If we 
adjust the 2000 rate in line with inflation over the intervening period it rises to R$294.77. 
This means that in real terms the minimum wage increased by around 73% between 2000 and 
2010. See Table 1.
31 2000 values are recalculated against the values for August 2010 (the month to which the 
census refers), adjusted for accumulated inflation over the intervening period of 95.2%. This 
figure was calculated using data from the Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor (INPC) 
via the site Portal Brasil (https://www.portalbrasil.net/inpc.htm).
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<TABLE 2>
Source: Elaborated by author from IBGE Censo 2000 and IBGE Censo 2010 (Amostra). 
Notwithstanding increased incomes and consumption between 2000 and 2010, there is little 
evidence that Juta’s class structure changed significantly. As shown in Table 3, the percentage 
of directors/senior managers and technical workers barely changed, while the number of 
professionals grew only slightly. Calculating the percentages of service and manual workers is 
more difficult due to definitional changes in the census. Most of those falling into the category 
of ‘elementary occupations’ in 2010 (jobs like domestic workers and security guards) would 
likely have been included within the aggregated category of ‘service workers’ in 2000, thus 
showing a small increase overall. Meanwhile, the categories, in the 2000 census, of ‘industrial 
production’ and ‘maintenance’ (aggregated as ‘industrial workers’ in Table 3) are likely to 
roughly correspond to the categories ‘skilled manual workers’ and ‘machine operators’ in 
2010. If so, it seems that industrial employment declined significantly over the period (even if 
part of this population may be contained within category of ‘ill-defined occupations’, which 
grew). This means the main trends in Juta between 2000 and 2010 were a decline in industrial 
employment, alongside small increases in the numbers of service and professional workers.
Table 3. Occupational groups in Fazenda da Juta, 2000 and 2010 (% of employed individuals 
aged 10+)
<TABLE 3>
Source: Elaborated by author from IBGE Censo 2000 and IBGE Censo 2010 (Amostra). 
* ‘Other occupations’ includes agricultural, military, police and ‘ill-defined’ occupations
Electoral trends
Although the challenges of gathering electoral data at a small scale make it difficult to track 
electoral shifts in Juta, it is possible to do so for the wider area of Sapopemba. Table 4 shows 
that in presidential elections Sapopemba’s voters gradually shifted away from the PT during 
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the Party’s 13 years in power, while support for the mainstream right-wing PSDB steadily grew 
between 2002 and 2014. Surprisingly, the key shift away from the PT appears to have occurred 
not between the elections of 2010 and 2014 as the economy stalled, but between 2006 and 2010 
when growth for the most part remained strong. In 2018, the vote share for the PT in 
Sapopemba fell to an all-time low of under 24%, less than half the level achieved in 2002, even 
if Bolsonaro’s vote percentage is also slightly lower than that achieved by Aécio Neves in 
2014. The difference is made up by a large number of abstentions and spoiled ballots, which 
account for almost a third of total votes.
Table 4. Presidential results (second rounds) for Brazil, São Paulo and Sapopemba, 2002-
2018 32 33 
<TABLE 4>
Source: Elaborated by author from Portal de Estatísticas do Estado de São Paulo and Election 
Resources on the Internet: Federal Elections in Brazil34
* Abstention and spoiled ballots
It is also worth noting that in November 2016, during my fieldwork, the PT were heavily 
defeated in São Paulo’s mayoral election, with the incumbent Fernando Haddad (who would 
go on to be the PT’s presidential candidate in 2018) losing in the first round to João Doria of 
the PSDB. In Sapopemba, the results were similar to that of the city as a whole, with around 
35% voting for Doria, just 10% for Haddad, and slightly less than 20% voting for other 
32 For the years 2002 and 2006, the data for Sapopemba refers to the electoral zone of 
Sapopemba. From 2010 onwards, it refers to two zones, Sapopemba and Teotônio Vilela, 
which, after rezoning, occupied the same territory. For these years, the results for the two 
zones were aggregated and averaged. It should be noted that this territory covers most of the 
district of Sapopemba, but is not identical to it. However, it does include Juta, which has 
fallen within the Teotônio Vilela electoral zone since 2010.
33 Shaded cells identify the winning candidates.
34 Portal de Estatísticas do Estado de São Paulo, Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de 
Dados (SEADE), Governo do Estado de São Paulo, available at 
http://produtos.seade.gov.br/produtos/eleicoes/candidatos/index.php?page=ele_sel&back=1 
[accessed 21/02/19]; Election Resources on the Internet: Federal Elections in Brazil – Results 
Lookup, available at http://electionresources.org/br/president.php?election=2018&state=BR 
[accessed 21/02/19].
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candidates.35 Given the high number of abstentions and spoiled ballots (which were slightly 
higher than the winning vote share), Doria was able to pass the 50% threshold to avoid a run-
off. This would thus fit with a general trend of declining support for the PT in Sapopemba. 
Overall, we can say that Sapopemba began, in 2002, being considerably more pro-PT than 
Brazil, but ended up being even less so than São Paulo. 
While this seems to imply a widespread rejection of the PT, interview data painted a somewhat 
different picture. On the whole, participants tended not to single out the PT, but rather to 
express disapproval of the political class as a whole. They typically described politicians as 
corrupt and self-interested, dismissing differences between political parties and holding them 
collectively responsible for Brazil’s crisis. The word “crisis” was invariably volunteered by 
respondents unprompted, and used flexibly to encompass unemployment and other economic 
difficulties, corruption scandals, failing public services and insecurity. As such, the notion of 
“crisis” and the figure of the corrupt politician appeared to be key pillars around which 
respondents organised their understandings of contemporary Brazilian society and what they 
believed was wrong with it. The following quote from Joice36, a 22-year-old web developer, 
was typical: 
I think they’re all the same. I don’t know. I might be talking nonsense, but for me they’re 
all the same. It’s like one comes in and things get worse, then another comes in and it 
gets even worse. So we’re kind of going through… it’s doesn’t stop being a crisis whether 
it’s Dilma or Temer… they just walk off together hand in hand, it’s the same thing. I 
think they’re there just to show that they’re in power, and that’s it. But stop taking what’s 
ours by right. They’re not going to stop doing that. I think we have the right to something, 
35 Portal de Estatísticas, SEADE
36 Interview conducted 27/06/16. Pseudonyms are used throughout. 
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and they’re not going to stop blocking that. Why? For their own benefit, to fill their own 
pockets. So I don’t think that will ever change.
These kinds of negative attitudes towards politicians were reflected in low levels of political 
engagement. Most respondents claimed to still vote in presidential elections, and almost all 
who were old enough had voted for Lula at least once (in 2002 and/or 2006). However, in 
recent elections, few had voted with any enthusiasm. With the exception of a few activists who 
were involved with local social movements and community organisations broadly aligned to 
the PT and wider left, none of the respondents was a member of a political party or had recently 
attended protests. This included the few respondents who identified as Bolsonaro supporters, 
suggesting that even those who had decisively embraced the rightward turn had not been 
actively mobilised.
Three narratives of the crisis
Angry workers
The group I label as “angry workers” were the largest and most diverse in terms of age, gender, 
race, occupation and religious practice. These respondents had little direct engagement with 
politics and their understandings seemed heavily shaped by television coverage. They 
expressed a strong aversion to politicians, were angered by corruption, and complained about 
high taxes. However, they also identified strongly as “workers”, framing this as their primary 
imagined community. As such, they tended to understand political corruption primarily 
through the lens of inequality, seeing it as a mechanism for the transfer of wealth from workers 
to politicians, whom they understood as part of a broader elite. While often critical of the PT 
they tended to express residual support for Lula and showed equal if not greater antipathy 
towards the other main parties. 
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Within this group, it was common for aversion to politics to be expressed in terms of general 
bewilderment. Many framed politics as something that made little sense, but was clearly a dirty 
business practiced by immoral people. Dona Maíra37, a retired secretary, aged 61, summed up 
such a view:
I don’t understand anything about politics. I’d like to understand, you know. When it 
starts, on the television, one starts talking, and then another, talking, talking, and I say 
“my God, now I don’t understand anything”. Did you see it the other day, one of them 
insulting another one? What language! […] For me, politics is basically them stealing. 
I’d like to understand, but it’s very complicated you know.
Dona Maíra understood the outcome of politics as being large-scale theft, but felt ill-equipped 
to understand the mechanisms through which this occurred. She had trouble distinguishing 
between different politicians and parties and was unfamiliar with the formal processes of 
political decision-making. However, as she continued to speak, Dona Maíra’s critique soon 
moved onto the terrain of class inequality:
There’s nothing good about them, nothing. Did you see there’s going to be a raise? For 
who? For them! [...] And the poor pensioners, when they get a raise it’s five per cent! If 
you earn a thousand, or a minimum salary, what does that get you? What’s ten per cent 
on top of one thousand? It’s nothing, just one hundred reais! […] I’d like to understand 
why they only do things to benefit themselves. Why don’t they think of the worker 
class… the working class? I hate it, I don’t like politics. That why I don’t go to protests, 
all that business, because it’s all politics.
Dona Maíra may have struggled to understand the procedural aspects of politics, but she was 
in no doubt as to its consequences. These she understood via a simple comparison of the salaries 
37 Interview conducted 08/06/16
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of deputies, which had just been increased, to workers’ pensions, which were being maintained 
at a level she felt was undignified. Based on her embedded knowledge of the costs of everyday 
life in the periphery, Dona Maíra felt able to assert not only the immorality, but also the social 
injustice of the actions of the political class as a whole. Although not accustomed to using the 
language of class, she was able to invoke the “working class” as the group to which she 
belonged and which she believed was the primary victim of the way politics operated in the 
country. 
Rejane38, a 53-year-old seamstress, offered a similar diagnosis, describing politics as a kind of 
machine producing the enrichment of a few individuals at the expense of the wider population. 
This system provided both effective impunity for the political class, and the guarantee that 
resulting economic costs would be borne by the taxpayer: 
Let me tell you something, I’d like to have, like, fifteen minutes on the television. 
Because it’s not fair… for people who work, who haven’t stolen anything… I say 
stealing, because that’s what it is… to pay someone else’s bill. Because if I steal […] you 
have to come to me. To me, because I did it. Isn’t that right? It’s like the government. 
The politicians stole, and then they tell the citizen, the worker, to pay more for their 
electricity bills, to pay more tax, while they evade it. And of those who stole, who goes 
to prison? They’re punished, but they get to stay at home. If a poor person steals a hat, 
are they punished? Yes, they go to prison. So there’s a difference between the politician 
and the poor worker, there’s a difference. 
The narrative of political corruption pursued by anti-government protest movements around 
2015-16 has been understood by many as suppressing a discourse of social inequality and class 
conflict, replacing it with a neoliberal framing that contrasts honest tax-payers with a corrupt 
38 Interview conducted 29/03/17
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and wasteful state.39 As the discourses of Dona Maíra and Rejane indicate, the reality among 
voters in the peripheries appears more complex. There is clearly a view of a corrupt political 
class exploiting the tax-and-spend functions of the state for its own ends. However, residents 
of Juta also, frequently and unprompted, deployed the language of class and social justice when 
discussing these themes. For Rejane, increased taxes were the mechanism by which wealth was 
transferred to the political class, but she saw the worker, rather than an undifferentiated 
aggregation of taxpayers, as the primary victim. The inherent inequality of the criminal justice 
system, in which the poor are punished while the rich are let off lightly for stealing on a far 
greater scale, is the clearest manifestation of the double standards that she believes run through 
Brazilian society. She also offers a solution that is framed in terms of radical redistribution: 
Let’s take what they bought, with stolen money, and let’s sell it. Because there are a lot 
of people who want to buy it. Let’s take the mansion, the second home and everything 
and let’s sell what he stole to pay the state. For us, the workers, because no one has done 
anything for us, for our pocket, in fact they only take from us. So let’s take from them, 
and sell it to pay the debt. 
While Rejane’s analysis of corruption echoes some of the themes central to Almeida’s 
‘conservative wave’, she frequently returned to questions of social inequality and justice and 
these seemed to provide the moral foundation of her arguments. For example, she proved quite 
immune to the arguments being promoted by the Temer government and much of the media 
about the economic necessity of raising the retirement age. Instead, she clearly interpreted the 
reform as a deliberate attack on the working class:
39 Almeida, ‘Bolsonaro presidente’
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They thought Dilma was bad, it’s worse now! She left the retirement at 45 working years, 
Temer raised it to 49. What’s that, do we have to go out and work in nappies?! While 
politicians have a good pension with few years of service. It’s such an injustice! 
As this suggests, complaints about high taxes should not in themselves be taken as evidence of 
pro-market attitudes. Rather, tax liabilities were just one part of a kind of mental accounting 
that respondents performed to determine whether politics was working for them. In these 
accounts, a dignified salary, a pension, other forms of social security, access to decent services, 
and everyday living costs were also factored in. What unites these is the question of the quality 
of everyday life in the peripheries and the perception of whether or not it was improving. This 
was to be contrasted with perceptions of the lifestyles of corrupt politicians.
Vanderlei,40 a 56-year-old administrative worker at a car company, offered a view similar to 
Rejane’s, understanding corruption as money stolen from taxpayers by politicians:
Vanderlei: I follow the news you know, Mateus, and I get so angry with the news we’ve 
been hearing recently. I myself didn’t know how much robbery there’s been in our 
country, from our deputies, the president, all this misbehaviour. You see, our country is 
in such a crisis, in such a situation, and really it’s them who created it. Taking our own 
money, our taxes, it’s absurd. This can’t happen in our country, it can’t, you understand?
Matthew: Do you think that all politicians are the same? Or are some worse than others?
Vanderlei: No at this point, almost all of them. It could be anyone. Though I’m not sure. 
After I heard from people, after I heard, I don’t know how much… people say the theft 
was all Lula. I earned well in the era of Lula’s presidency, I earned money. I earned ok. 
40 Interview conducted on 21/07/17
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He reduced the IPI,41 he reduced it, especially in my area. I can’t say anything, I earned 
money, I had at least four good years. 
Even if he was unsure about possible differences between politicians, Vanderlei attributed his 
“four good years” to Lula, and was skeptical about claims that Lula and the PT were more 
corrupt than other politicians and parties. Like other angry workers he was highly cynical about 
the motivations for Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and believed that the situation had only 
worsened under Temer. He also appeared to identify with Lula, identifying his status as a fellow 
worker, who, like Vanderlei, had moved from the Northeastern state of Pernambuco to São 
Paulo at a young age. He also recognised Lula’s efforts to expand opportunities for the poor, 
which did clearly distinguish him from other politicians:
I’ll tell you, he opened up university for everyone who didn’t have it before. They don’t 
like that, those politicians from the PMDB, the PDS and everything, they only want to 
help who? Their own kids. And he gave it to the poor, black, white, dark-skinned. And 
that was one of Lula’s great virtues, cause he was a Northeasterner from the countryside 
and he came to work, and he overcame everything and made it. So they get angry as hell 
about that. Because the majority of people… the billionaires are a minority and they want 
to eat everything. And the workers… That’s it, that’s why they get so angry.
Although angry workers like Vanderlei felt deeply disaffected, they refused to accept the 
narrative that the PT was solely responsible for the “crisis”. Indeed, many acknowledged the 
Party as the only one that had meaningfully improved their lives, and some continued to see 
Lula as a fellow worker, even if he had become tainted by politics. However, it was very much 
an open question whom these respondents would vote for by the time of the next election.
41 ‘Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados’ (tax on manufactured products)
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At one point during our conversation, Vanderlei took me by surprise. He told me that if Lula 
was cleared of corruption charges and was able to run he would consider voting for him again. 
However, if Lula was found guilty he was not sure who he would vote for (he had not heard of 
Bolsonaro at the time of the interview). If this were to happen, he thought that the best option 
for the country might be military intervention. In seconds, Vanderlai had gone from defending 
a central figure of Brazil’s redemocratisation, to advocating the return of authoritarian rule. 
From the perspective of partisan debates this may seem highly contradictory, but in terms of 
what Vanderlai wanted from politics there was no contradiction at all. Aside from his anger at 
political corruption, he was also concerned about security, which he discussed in very localised 
terms. He was particularly exercised about the behaviour of young men who sold drugs at the 
entrance of a small favela opposite his house. Having served in the military as a young man, 
Vanderlei felt that young people no longer had the kind of discipline necessary to maintain 
order in society. During our interview he tended to speak in the language of an angry worker, 
but at times he drifted into the kind of discourse typical of those I call “disgruntled citizens”.
Disgruntled citizens 
These respondents were far fewer in number than angry workers, almost all were male and 
most attended Evangelical churches,42 however they were diverse in terms of age, race and 
occupation. They tended to be fairly well informed about, or at least interested in, politics, 
often getting news and information via social media as well as television. However, none was 
a member of a political party or had recently attended a protest. These respondents tended to 
consistently produce conservative discourse, especially when discussing issues such as 
corruption and security, and were explicitly antipetista, tending to blame the PT more than 
other parties for the crisis. However, they were almost equally disapproving of the other 
42 While most disgruntled citizens identified as Evangelical, not all Evangelicals were in this 
group, also appearing in the other two. 
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mainstream parties. They tended to frame their political views in ways that emphasised the 
nation, and law and order, rather than class conflict, typically referring to an imagined 
community of “citizens”, rather than workers. However, when discussing the social policy 
agenda implemented by the PT they often shifted towards a more inequality-based discourse. 
Like Vanderlai, Anderson43, a 44-year-old Uber driver and volunteer with a drug rehabilitation 
programme run by his Evangelical church, seemed to shift between different ideological frames 
during our interview, though with the difference that he adopted a firm and explicit antipetista 
stance. Anderson had previously voted for Lula, but became increasingly exasperated with the 
Party and had voted for Aécio Neves in 2014, “to get rid of Dilma”. He had also been in favour 
of Rousseff’s impeachment, however he had hoped it would lead to fresh elections rather than 
the accession of Temer, whom he believed was as bad as his predecessor. When discussing 
politics, Anderson repeated several far-right tropes. This included a revisionist account of 
Brazil’s dictatorship, arguing that it had saved Brazil from “turning into Cuba” and had been 
misrepresented by “opinion formers and artists” who falsely claimed they’d been persecuted.
On the other hand, when he started to speak about questions closer to home, his language 
notably softened. Anderson had voted for Doria in the 2016 mayoral election (“to get rid of 
Haddad, who only cared about installing speed cameras so he could fine us”). However, he was 
unconvinced by Doria’s first year in office, saying that he had not delivered on campaign 
promises like improving access to healthcare. He complained that like a previous PSDB Mayor, 
Gilberto Kassab, Doria favoured big business over ordinary people. Similarly, when asked for 
his view on the PT’s legacy in office, he offered a surprisingly nuanced, and, if anything, left 
leaning critique:
43 Interview conducted 29/08/17
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I think we can say the PT were 50%. They got lots of people into university, which you 
couldn’t do [before]. You have to say that. […] But other things [too] that I always say… 
they did good things, they reduced the IPI for people to be able to buy a television, right, 
a car. But on the other hand, they didn’t think about other things. For me, healthcare 
wasn’t very good, during their administration, it wasn’t very good. Where they could 
have done other things, they only reduced the price of a television. 
We can see that despite his explicit anti-PT positioning, Anderson performs a similar kind of 
accounting to that of the angry workers. The PT had enabled people like him to access higher 
education and consumer markets that were previously beyond their reach. However, they had 
not made sufficient progress in improving vital public services. These critiques along with 
generalised anger against all the major parties on grounds of corruption, was leading him to 
take an interest in Bolsonaro. Anderson claimed not to know enough about Bolsonaro yet to 
make a final decision, but at least considered him to be something new: 
Look, I want a new government, so the new option there is Bolsonaro. [I’m] thinking 
seriously about him, because PMDB, PSDB, PT, right, PMDB, all of them, they’re all 
together, you know? If we want change, what do we have to do? Put new people there! 
Not to put in a new deputy, a councillor, because he’s going to pave my street, or install 
street lamps on my street, for the neighbourhood… [but] for the country, you know.
Although concerned about educational opportunities and public services for lower-income 
groups, Anderson’s reference to the good of the “country” seemed to override these questions. 
That is to say, the considerations that informed his political outlook were not radically different 
to those of the angry workers. The difference was that he was willing to subordinate these 
concerns to his desire for a “new” political actor, and his identification of the “country”, rather 
than the working class, as his primary imagined community. 
Page 26 of 43
Cambridge University Press
Submission to JLAS
Referee's copy only
27
This distinction was even clearer in my interview with Fernando44, a 49-year-old security guard 
and regular attendee of a Pentecostal church. Whereas Anderson was not yet sure whom he 
would support against the PT, Fernando was clear about his preferred alternative. He had 
previously voted for both Lula and Dilma, but had become increasingly exasperated with the 
PT due to what he saw as its special treatment of particular groups, including convicts, non-
whites and sexual minorities: 
For example, the Bolsa Presídio [Prisoner’s Grant], the age of criminal responsibility, 
racial quotas, prejudice. Because the law is for individuals, not for groups. It’s 
individuals, men, in the general sense, who have to submit to the law, not a created group. 
The gay group, the lesbian group, religious groups. No, the law is the law. We’re all 
equal before the law. So that’s enough. You don’t need to have laws for groups if we’re 
all equal. […] The PT divided the country in groups. It turned the country against itself. 
It was the PT itself that created this whole issue of prejudice, of all these fights over what 
people think.
Based on his belief that the PT had undermined the unity of the country, Fernando openly 
declared his preference for military intervention so that order and unity could be re-established. 
Failing this, he would vote for the candidate whom he believed embodied these values: 
Bolsonaro. 
Like Anderson, though, Fernando had far more nuanced views when it came to questions of 
economic and social policy. Indeed, much of his own life history revolved around struggling 
and eventually managing to access crucial public services. Fernando lived with his wife and 
two teenage daughters in a small but comfortable apartment in which they had been rehoused 
a few years earlier from their previous home in a precarious land occupation. He had suffered 
44 Interview conducted 21/08/17
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for years from a debilitating disease though was treated within the public health system and 
eventually cured. Today, one of his daughters benefits from a higher education ProUni grant, 
a programme introduced by the PT. Indeed, Fernando expressed support for ProUni and also, 
with reservations, the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer programme: 
ProUni is excellent, because it helps people on low incomes enter university, you 
understand? So any kind of grant that helps people to learn, I’m in favour. Because it’s 
benefiting the people, the financially less well-off. So if there’s a grant to incentivise an 
individual to study, to facilitate the training of that person, I’m in favour. Now [Bolsa] 
Família I’m in favour too, but as long as there’s better supervision of who receives it 
[…] because lots of people don’t need it.
Fernando propounded values of equality and meritocracy, combining elements traditionally 
associated with both left and right. He agreed with the mainstream left-wing diagnosis that in 
a highly unequal society poverty reduction and social mobility require significant state-led 
redistribution. However, he rejected non-economic criteria such as race and sexuality as 
legitimate grounds for government support, viewing this as anti-meritocratic. Perhaps most 
emphatically, he argued the state was ineffective and permissive in responding to crime, citing 
his family’s forced daily coexistence with drug dealers in their previous home in the land 
occupation. For Fernando, reasserting the rule of law, as he put it, overrode every other 
consideration.
As this suggests, the views of disgruntled citizens like Anderson and Fernando may seem 
contradictory from the perspective of ideological debates, but they make a lot of sense in the 
context of everyday life in a place like Juta. For example, Fernando’s combination of left- and 
right-wing policy preferences is firmly rooted in his own experiences of having benefitted from 
the PT’s health, education and housing policies, but also of having worked hard to survive and 
raise two daughters in a context of limited opportunities and everyday risks. Similar patterns 
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can be observed among many other Juta residents, including those who occupy a polar opposite 
position on the political spectrum.
Nostalgic strugglers
It is instructive to compare the views of disgruntled citizens, to another with which, on face 
value, they should have little in common; a group I refer to as nostalgic strugglers. These 
respondents were more likely to be older, female and to identify as Catholic (although there 
were also Evangelicals fitting this profile). Many had settled in Juta in the 1980s and 1990s 
when they had participated in radical housing movements and some continued to be involved 
with the influential local network of community organisations that had evolved out of these 
movements. Nostalgic strugglers were more politicised than average, some regularly attended 
demonstrations, and they invariably voted for the PT (or other leftist parties). However, they 
were often also critical of the PT, usually not on grounds of corruption, but rather for having 
distanced itself from the grassroots and cosied up to elites. Perhaps more surprisingly, despite 
their strong political identifications, they found themselves at odds with important aspects of 
the discourse and policy agenda of the contemporary left. 
For example, Denise45, aged 57, was a retired cleaner who had participated in the original 
occupation of Juta and still lived in the home she had built herse f, along with her son who was 
now studying at university. She proudly recounted marching down the Avenida Sapopemba 
with the other occupiers in the late-1980s, to defend themselves from eviction. Ever since, 
Denise had been a PT voter, identifying the Party as having supported her struggle to overcome 
poverty and eventually achieve stability and intergenerational social mobility. She believed 
that the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff had been a “coup” and condemned Brazil’s political 
and economic elites who had instigated it. Nonetheless, when the question of the PT’s policy 
45 Interview conducted 09/07/16
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legacy arose, she began to express some reservations, particularly with regard to the Bolsa 
Família programme:
In the countryside, what happens? They receive Bolsa Família, and they take that little 
bit of money, they build a little house, and the family grows. And it’s one child a year, 
the family grows, the family grows, because the money keeps coming. Work? Nothing! 
You understand? They don’t work, and just live on that bit of money, and go on having 
kids. […] I don’t think that’s right too, I don’t think it’s fair.
Denise was troubled by the idea that another of the PT’s landmark policies, Bolsa Família, 
should allow poor people the option to live – comfortably, she believed – on state benefits. Her 
account, of a non-specific “countryside” (“interior” in Portuguese) appears to be influenced by 
stigmatizing media representations of poor rural areas. Nonetheless, what seems to make such 
narratives chime with Denise is that her own life experience of working hard for little financial 
reward. It seemed incongruous to her that a poor person should not have to work to survive. 
This was further reinforced by Denise’s discussion of Brazil’s economic “crisis”, a claim that 
impressed her little:
On that subject I can speak very well. Twenty five years ago when I arrived here in São 
Paulo all we have to eat was chicken carcass, you know the bones of the chicken? […] 
We made oil out of chicken carcass. As we had to do that, we used to ask at the butchers 
[saying it was] for the dogs, that it was to make food for the dogs. Because we were 
ashamed, cause it was dog food. So today, when people say to me “ah, crisis” […]. Crisis! 
This isn’t a crisis! Because crisis... you see parents today who go to the shopping centre 
and pay one thousand for a pair of trainers, a thousand reais for a cell phone, one 
thousand five hundred… just for their kid to be mugged on a street corner. Yeah, I see a 
parent who’s clueless […], that’s never been through a crisis. Today I don’t see crisis, I 
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see bad education, bad parenting. Because I know what it’s like to work and not have 
money to buy bread. So crisis... it’s over!
Denise’s understanding of what constituted a “crisis” was learned during Brazil’s period of 
hyper-inflation, when extreme poverty of the kind she experienced was widespread. That is to 
say, it pre-dates the more recent fall in absolute poverty and increased access to cheap 
consumer goods, but also shifts towards more precarious employment and rising costs in other 
areas. Despite her expressed commitment to social justice, the notion of poor people having 
access to consumer goods sat uneasily with her notion of what it means to “struggle”. 
Such a disconnect can also be detected in attitudes towards political engagement. Elena46, a 
social assistant at an community organisation in Juta who had been a militant in Juta’s mutirão 
movement during the 1990s, spoke wistfully of a time when politics seemed to make more 
sense. Like other nostalgic strugglers, she frequently used the word “struggle”, which for her 
had a powerful political meaning: 
It was a beautiful struggle. In those days, that kind of beautiful struggle existed. There 
was unity, the people were united. So if you had money to travel you’d go to the protests 
or whatever, or if you didn’t your colleagues would help you out. […] If you didn’t have 
money for food, the others got together. It was a beautiful struggle. 
“Struggle” seemed to represent something central to Elena’s political identity and values, 
combining solidarity, a clear political project, and a spirit of perseverance. By contrast she 
believed these qualities to be lacking in current forms of housing action, in particular in the 
various new informal occupations that had sprung up around Juta over previous years. She 
recounted a criticism she had just made of a colleague who was at risk of being evicted from 
her home in a land occupation:
46 Interview conducted 26/04/17
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I’m going to struggle for housing, but in what way are you going to struggle for housing? 
These days they want everything easy. In our day we knew things took time, it’s 
something that takes years, it doesn’t happen overnight. These days they want it for 
today. That’s why there are lots of occupations. I was just having a go at the girl in the 
kitchen there. […] She came and said to me that she can’t sleep at night because she’s so 
worried about being evicted, she has five children. I said this, but also Sheila, you don’t 
want to struggle. […] Today people want everything they desire, don’t they? They desire 
lots of things, in the days when we struggled, it wasn’t like that. Today people want 
everything in their hands. No-one wants to struggle anymore.
Elena continued to participate in social movements and regularly attended protests. However, 
like Denise, she felt estranged from some political causes that others on the left had taken up –
 such as Bolsa Família and the legitimacy of disorganised land occupations – and was 
unimpressed by those whom she believed were not struggling. Lessons she had learned over 
the life course about what constituted valid political objectives and legitimate means of 
pursuing them seemed to no longer apply. For those like Denise and Elena, political 
identification with the left and embeddedness within activist networks, seemed to act as a 
buffer against developing deeper sympathy for explicitly right-wing discourse. However, on 
some issues – in particular the question of welfare for the poor – their views were often further 
to the right than those who were gravitating towards Bolsonaro. 
Discussion: Place, political articulation and opinion formation in the peripheries
The three broad groups identified do not exhaust the diversity encountered in Juta during the 
research. Further groups and subgroups could be identified, for example through closer analysis 
of the influence of important demographic variables like age, gender and race on political 
subjectivity. Furthermore, as the discussion has highlighted, the boundaries between the three 
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groups are highly porous, with some attitudes and discourses spanning across them while others 
do not. In fact, it is probably more helpful to think of them not as groups of discrete individuals 
at all, but rather as narrative frameworks available to individual subjects to adopt and, to some 
extent, combine. Notwithstanding these qualifications, these frameworks highlight several 
points that I believe are crucial for understanding contemporary processes of political 
subjectivity formation in Brazil’s urban peripheries.
A first important observation is that many of the concerns highlighted by respondents, and the 
broad terms in which they are understood, were relatively consistent and based on widely 
shared experiences, many of them rooted in place. In particular, these revolved around 
squeezed incomes, poor public services and insecurity. This strong convergence suggests that 
concrete conditions and recent transformations in peripheries override abstract ideological 
motivations in determining attitudes on a wide range of social issues. When invited to discuss 
politics, respondents rarely spoke in abstract terms – for example, about meritocracy, the “free 
market” or sexual morality – themes which some have interpreted as key drivers of the 
rightward turn in the peripheries.47 Rather they tended to speak about the concrete, everyday 
challenges they faced, drawing a contrast between these and a realm of official politics 
perceived as remote and unresponsive.
Within these broadly shared parameters, many of the variations that did exist could at times 
appear almost arbitrary. Dyed-in-the-wool antipetistas could express support for large parts of 
the PT’s policy legacy, while proud petistas could be deeply hostile to flagship PT policies. 
Those with no overriding partisan identification, positive or negative, combined heterogeneous 
elements in ways that best made sense to them. In other ways, however, clear patterns could 
be observed. The broad terms in which respondents framed their answers seemed to signal that 
47 Fundação Perseu Abramo, Percepções e Valores
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a particular interpretive framework was being called into action. The framework deployed 
allowed for subjects to construct arguments around the issues or principles they ranked as most 
important, though without obliging them to completely abandon other issues that might not 
neatly fit. Such discursive strategies seem to offer citizens in the peripheries a way of dealing 
with the problem of a poor alignment between their needs and what mainstream politics has to 
offer them. Given that most politicians and parties appear to fall badly short, it is difficult for 
peripheral subjects to maintain a high degree of partisan loyalty or ideological consistency. 
Interpretive frameworks make it possible to harness diverse experiences and opinions into more 
coherent lines of argument, thus allowing at least the possibility of taking a position in relation 
to official politics beyond blanket rejection.
This raises the question of how individuals come to arrive at a particular framework. Based on 
the examples presented, this process appears to be the product of diverse influences operating 
over different scales and temporal horizons. Firstly, they clearly related to individual 
experiences and lessons learned over the life course, many of which were also associated with 
place. When justifying their views, respondents could emphasise experiences of winning 
improvements to their neighbourhood through social mobilisation, or the persistence of 
inadequate services. As this implies, while perceptions of place are heavily prescribed by 
concrete conditions, individual experiences of them may still vary significantly, leading to 
more positive or negative perceptions and, ultimately, different political positions. 
A second factor that appears to heavily influence the adoption of narrative frameworks, and 
which is also strongly tied to place, is the individual’s network of sociability. The political 
identities of nostalgic strugglers seemed heavily linked to their involvement with left-aligned 
social movements and community organisations. Meanwhile, disgruntled citizens were 
disproportionately likely to regularly attend Pentecostal churches. In this case, there is clearly 
a strong amount of overlap between religious doctrine and core tenets of ultra-conservative 
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ideology, most notably in the values associated with the ‘gospel of prosperity’ and shared 
opposition to cultural liberalism.48 However, in the heterogeneous and fluid institutional 
landscape of urban peripheries,49 such relationships should not be viewed deterministically. 
Residents may frequent left-leaning community organisations or conservative churches 
without significantly absorbing their ideological tenets and political cultures. Rather than 
comprehensively moulding subjects then, they might better be understood as anchoring 
individuals to broad partisan identifications.50 It is interesting to note that explicitly religious 
issues were rarely mentioned by disgruntled citizens, while nostalgic strugglers’ identification 
with the left seemed to be based more on concrete personal experiences and relationships than 
commitment to abstract principles. For most angry workers, personal experience, the influence 
of family, friends and mainstream media, and identification with the category of “worker”, 
seemed to substitute for exposure to more structured organisational influences.
However, even if shared socio-spatial conditions, individual life experiences and networks of 
sociability – all strongly tied to place – are crucial to the formation of political opinion in 
peripheries, these must still ultimately articulate in some way with the realm of formal politics, 
even if only at election time. It is here that the question of ‘political articulation’ becomes 
central. While most residents of peripheries may perceive politics as distant from their 
everyday lives, political actors can articulate certain matters of concern in ways that resonate. 
Where politicians can engage with and build upon existing framings and linguistic tropes – of 
“workers” or “citizens”, “struggle” or “order” – they may improve their chances of attracting 
support. At particular moments this may take a cathartic form, when everyday lived experience 
and attitudes that usually fail to be meaningfully represented publicly are suddenly articulated 
in mainstream debate. The victories of Lula, and, at least for some peripheral voters, 
48 Almeida, ‘Bolsonaro presidente’
49 Feltran, Fronteiras de tensão 
50 Rocha, ‘Petismo e Lulismo’
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Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018, may have been experienced in this way. However, for most 
residents, elections are experienced as momentary choices between generally unappealing 
options, after which things largely remain the same.
Conclusion: Rethinking the rightward turn
The evidence from Fazenda da Juta suggests that ideological factors – understood as a 
consistent commitment to right-wing principles, whether articulated explicitly or implicitly –
 have played only a minor role in the rightward electoral turn in peripheries during the crisis. 
Even respondents who identified politically with Bolsonaro did not consistently echo his 
agenda, and certainly not with regard to themes such as meritocracy and marketisation. The 
consistency of concerns expressed by diverse respondents, in particular emphasizing squeezed 
incomes, poor public services and insecurity, suggests that the experience of living under 
particular socio-spatial conditions overrides ideological commitments. On many substantive 
issues a resident of the periphery would be more likely to agree with a neighbour who votes 
for a different party than with a middle-class Paulistano who happens to vote for the same one. 
As such, we should primarily look to factors associated with place and political articulation, 
rather than ideology, to understand the rightward turn.
If place provides the basis on which substantive issues are prioritised by respondents, how did 
a candidate who seemed to promote a largely elitist agenda manage to capture so many votes 
in the peripheries? It is true that Bolsonaro did not meaningfully articulate issues like the poor 
quality of public services and squeezed incomes. Indeed, he made almost no concrete economic 
or social policy offer to lower-income voters at all. On the other hand, his focus on the issue of 
corruption would have found fertile terrain. While largely viewed as a moral issue by the 
middle classes, corruption was commonly understood by respondents through the lens of 
inequality; as a means by which wealth was transferred from workers to the elite. Such 
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conceptual flexibility allowed Bolsonaro to articulate different, even contradictory, messages 
to these different constituencies, a crucial skill when trying to construct a diverse electoral 
coalition. Through his hardline discourse on security issues and, to a lesser extent, Bolsa 
Família,51 he also fed into narratives that were already strongly present in peripheries. As 
compared to Bolsonaro’s core upper-middle-class constituency, these issues take on very 
different meanings in a place like Juta, where anxieties about insecurity and the value attached 
to hard work are experienced as everyday personal struggles and form a core part of many 
people’s identities. All of this is to say that Bolsonaro, whether intentionally or not, was able 
to articulate matters of concern in ways that would have resonated with significant numbers of 
peripheral voters, tapping into their changing experiences of place.
However, while such an understanding of political articulation revolves around the mediated 
discourse of distant political actors, the local institutional context through which such discourse 
flows and takes on practical meaning seems at least as important. Local institutions play a 
crucial role in either reinforcing or countering narratives and proposals articulated by 
politicians. As others have pointed out,52 social movements, grassroots Catholic organisations 
and trade unions that played such a role in connecting the PT to peripheral populations have 
all lost space in peripheries over recent decades. Although Juta may have survived this process 
in better shape than most given its strong network of left-aligned community organisations, 
even there it is clear that many perceive the Party as being distant from their lives just like all 
the others. While Bolsonaro’s ability to articulate some pertinent issues in peripheries in 2018 
was highly contingent, such shifts in the social and institutional structure of life in peripheries 
seem more durable and indicate that it will be difficult for the PT to recover the ground it 
51 Having long been opposed to the programme, Bolsonaro’s language softened during the 
election campaign, although he continued to emphasise fraud and to paint claimants as lazy. 
52 Feltran, Fronteiras de Tensão; Rocha, ‘Petismo e Lulismo’
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occupied at the height of its influence. Nonetheless, there is clearly still a large appetite in 
places like Juta for a politics of redistribution and improved public services. If there were not 
already a mass, left-wing party competing for votes in the peripheries, it would certainly be 
necessary to invent one.
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Figure 1. Location of Fazenda da Juta 
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Table 1. Real monthly household income per capita (for all household members aged 10+) in minimum 
wages for Fazenda da Juta and the municipality of São Paulo, 2000 and 2010 (% of households) 
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Table 2. Possession of consumer goods in Fazenda da Juta, 2000 and 2010 (% of households) 
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Table 3. Occupational groups in Fazenda da Juta, 2000 and 2010 (% of employed individuals aged 10+) 
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Table 4. Presidential results (second rounds) for Brazil, São Paulo and Sapopemba, 2002-2018 
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